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CRIMINAL LAW
KIDS, GROUPS AND CRIME: SOME
IMPLICATIONS OF A WELL-KNOWN
SECRET*
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING**
Social and policy sciences, reflecting human nature, are rich in con-
tradiction and are occasionally perverse. It is sometimes possible both to
know something important and to ignore that knowledge. To do this is
to generate the phenomenon of the well-known secret, an obvious fact
we ignore. When Edgar Allen Poe suggested that the best location to
hide something is the most obvious place, he was teaching applied law
and social science.
This article is about youth crime and sentencing policy. The "well-
known secret" is this: adolescents commit crimes, as they live their lives,
in groups. While the empirical evidence for this hypothesis is at least
fifty years old, the consequences of this simple and important finding are
frequently ignored when we measure crime, pass laws, and postulate
theories of criminal activity. The problems associated with ignoring the
obvious have grown more serious in recent years, as the study of crimi-
nal behavior has shifted from its sociological origins into a wide spec-
trum of social, behavioral, economic, and policy science disciplinary
sub-specialties. We have failed to ask the right questions and have
risked answering the questions we ask in the wrong way because we did
not appreciate what we already know.
The sentiments expressed in this article are strong: the burden of
* The research reported in these pages was supported by Grant DJ/LEAA 79NI-AX-
0072, National Institute of Justice. The data for analysis were provided by Wesley Skogan,
Northwestern University; the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California: the Vera
Institute of Justice, New York City; and Philip Cook, Duke University. My primary
intellectual creditors in this venture include Peter Greenwood and Joan Petersilia, Rand
Corp.; Gordon Hawkins, University of Sydney; Alfred Blumstein, Carnegie-Mellon
University; Albert Reiss, Yale University and Norval Morris, University of Chicago.
** Professor of Law and Director, Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of
Chicago; J.D. University of Chicago, 1967; B.A. Wayne State University, 1963.
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proof is mine. I shall attempt to meet that burden in two stages. Part I
discusses some evidence on adolescent crime as group behavior that
emerged from the pioneering studies of the Chicago School in the 1920s,
and supplements this rich information with more recent crime specific
estimates of group criminality. Part II catalogues some of the things we
do not know as a consequence of ignoring the obvious.
I. KIDS, GROUPS AND CRIME: THEN AND Now
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay wrote a major study for the first
National Commission on Crime. The year was 1931. The title was Male
juvenile Delinqueng as Group Behavior.1 The essay was based on an analy-
sis of all boys who appeared in the Cook County, Illinois Juvenile Court
charged with delinquency during 1928. The analysis justified the title of
their essay, as shown in their original Figure 9, now labeled Figure 1.
Percent
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Group offenders
FIGURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF LONE AND GROUP OFFENDERS AMONG
OFFENDERS BROUGHT TO THE JUVENILE COURT
Eight out of ten boys accused of delinquency were alleged to have com-
mitted their offenses in the company of one or more companions. Shaw
and McKay extended this analysis by specifying the number of partici-
pants alleged in the 1928 petition sample as shown in Figure 2, their
original Figure 10.
While these findings were dramatic, they were not surprising. A
1923 study of theft offenders in the same court had found that nine out
of ten males charged with theft were believed to have committed their
offenses in groups.2
1 C. SHAw & H. McKAY, Malejuvenile Ddeinuen as Group Behavior in Report on the Causes
of Crime, 191-99 [II WICKERSHAM COMM'N REP., No. 13 (1931)], reprinted as Chapter 17 in
THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE METROPOLIS (J. Short ed. 1971). [hereinafter cited as THE
SOCIAL FABRIC].
2 See id., THE SOCIAL FABRIC, at 256, n.2.
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More recent data on the relationship between groups and adoles-
cent criminality are needed for two reasons. First, 1928 was quite a
while ago. Second, the petty thieves depicted by Shaw and McKay har-









PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFENDERS BROUGHT TO
COURT BY NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
(S-- Sh.. & Mdc.,)
city. The authors of one textbook on criminology observe how "quaint"
the Shaw and McKay "delinquents seem to us today, in their knicker-
bockers and cloth caps and pre-Atomic innocence."' 3 Furthermore,
while group activity is associated with most juvenile delinquency, there
is a tendency to revert to individualistic models when discussing serious
crime.
Modem evidence is available on the predominance of groups as a
distinctive aspect of adolescent criminality, including the serious offenses
that are the focus of recent concern about youth crime policy. Table 1
shows data collected from a sample of robbery victims in the National
Crime Panel in 1973.




ROBBERY INCIDENTS BY NUMBER OF OFFENDERS
AND AGE GROUPS*








( No .-  Cn.- P-1, D .,, proded by W~ky Skog-. N-hwo-n Unlve-y.)
* Cases in which offenders were identified as mixed age groups deleted.
For present purposes, the National Crime Panel data are deficient in
two aspects. Since the method of the survey was to ask victims to guess
the ages of offenders, it was necessary to use crude age categories. Rob-
beries committed by offenders "under 21" are hardly homogeneous
events. The second shortcoming of the National Crime Panel data is
that when victims are asked to guess ages, a substantial number of incor-
rect guesses may produce a random error factor that would mute any
difference in pattern between younger and older offenders because of
improper classification.
Despite its drawbacks, the National Crime Panel data show that
the relationship between the offender's age and group robbery is strik-
ing. Slightly more than a third of the robberies committed by offenders
under 21 are committed by a single assailant compared with 61 percent
of those robberies where the victim believes the offender was over 21. At
the other end of the distribution, younger offenders commit five times as
many victimizations in groups of four or more than do older offenders.
More precise data on youth criminality are available from the re-
cent Vera Institute of Justice analysis of the delinquency jurisdiction of
New York's Family Court. Figure 3 is an analysis of a sample of cases
leading to court referral of offenders under age 16 and thus eligible for
Family Court processing in New York City. This figure is comparable
to the information presented in the first Shaw and McKay analysis.
The Vera sample counts each alleged delinquent as a separate case.
Thus, if two juveniles are referred for one robbery, this will result in two
cases of group robbery while a single 15-year-old arrested for robbery
counts as only one case. For this reason, the New York data overstate
the number of offenses that are the product of group participation, but
the method allows direct comparison with the Shaw and McKay figures
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which were compiled using the same approach.4
Gun Robbery (n= 78 ) 1 90%
Other Robbery (n=333) 87%
Burglary (n491) 86%
Rape (n=8) 50%
Sodomy (n= 13) 77%
Assault (n=146) 1 60%
Homicide (n=9) f 78%
FIGURE 3
MULTIPLE OFFENDER CASES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL
JUVENILES CHARGED, BY CRIME
NEw YORK CITY
(S-- V- W & - apl, F-ay Co- Dpcion .S.dy)
With the exception of assault and rape (n=8), the bar charts bear what
can only be called a striking resemblance to each other and to the theft
estimates that emerged from the Chicago area studies.
The predominance of group crime in this sample of young adoles-
cent offenders (under 16) is similar to the earlier studies ofjuvenile theft,
but occurs across a wide variety of offenses. For these age groups, the
youthfulness of the offender appears to predict group participation more
effectively than the nature of the offense.
The New York data were not coded in a way that could replicate
the pre-computer precision of Shaw and McKay's distribution of theft
offenses by number of offenders. 5 However, a sample of armed robbery
arrests referred to Juvenile Court in Los Angeles collected by the Rand
Corporation does permit this further detail, as shown in Figure 4.
4 Vera Institute of Justice, Family Court Disposition Study (1981) (unpublished draft).
5 The Vera study dichotomized juvenile court cases into individual and group events. A








Offenders 1 3 4 5 numbe
FIGURE 4
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF ARMED ROBBERY OFFENSES
INVOLVING JUVENILE SUSPECTS BY NUMBER OF
OFFENDERS,
Los ANGELES*
%ourer R~ed Cbp/Ju-1 Rmol Study. 1979)
* Percentages rounded
In the Rand sample, 18 out of 103 robbery incidents attributable to
juveniles involved lone offenders. The 97 robbery incidents for which
the number of offenders was coded provide a potential pool of over 225
robbery arrests, and about a third of the incidents involved three or
more offenders. The Los Angeles robbery data supplement the broader
New York sample in several respects. First, the way in which the data
were coded permits us to move closer to "offender to offense" ratios.
Each robbery event was reported only once, eliminating the systematic
overestimation of group crime that occurs when each offender charged is
counted as a separate case. Second, Los Angeles operates a juvenile jus-
tice system that defines the eighteenth birthday as the end of juvenile
court jurisdiction, while New York cuts off jurisdiction at the sixteenth
birthday. This two-year interval is important: over half of the Los An-
geles robberies (56%) involve defendants of age sixteen or seventeen.
These cases would not result in family court processing of the sample
defendants in New York. The proportion of all robberies committed by
these sixteen and seventeen year-olds in groups is as substantial as that
found among younger adolescents. Because the rate of robbery and
other serious violent offenses is much greater among older adolescents,
the Los Angeles findings suggest the impact of multiple offender adoles-
cent crime and multiple arrests on aggregate statistics will be much
greater.
II. So WHAT?
This essay is intended neither as a comprehensive survey of the evi-
dence on group criminality during adolescence, nor as an assessment of
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the importance of this data to criminological theories about delinquent
behavior. Empirical studies documenting adolescent crime abound.6
The criminological literature discussing the implications of "dyadic,"
"triadic," and "other group" conformations is extensive. Whatever else
may be said of modern criminology, the role of "male juvenile delin-
quency as group behavior" is acknowledged as fundamental, and the
extent to which different types of criminality exhibit similar characteris-
tics is well-known, although the New York and Los Angeles data
presented earlier provide us with larger numbers of serious offenses than
many modern delinquency studies. 7
This well-known pattern has important implications for contempo-
rary research dealing with crime statistics, general deterrence, incapaci-
tation, the construction of models of criminal behavior, the study of
criminal careers, and efforts to reform sentencing practices in juvenile
and criminal courts. These relatively recent research subspecialties are
the intellectual next-door neighbors to traditional studies of crime and
delinquency. Lately, however, the neighbors have not been speaking to
each other.
(1) ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION AND VOLUME OF SERIOUS YOUTH
CRIME
No one doubts that young offenders account for a disproportionate
share of most serious crimes. But the question is, how large a share?
This cannot be answered with current data. The evidence for this asser-
tion goes beyond fashionable doubts about a "dark figure" of crime or of
offenders. The current state of the art for estimating the youth share of
serious crime is:
(a) to establish the percentage of persons under 18 or 21 arrested for a
particular offense; and
(b) to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the percentage distribution of
arrests accurately reflects the percentage distribution of crimes.
6 For general reviews of the literature on this subject see: R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, Suhcul-
tural and Gang Delinquency, in KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 80-109 (1970) (includes data on
British and Scandanavian group behavior by age); K. Sveri, Group Activity, in 1
SCANDANAVIAN STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 173-85 (C. Christiansen ed. 1965); PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, JUVENILE GANGS (Report of G.
Geis 1965).
7 The number of unambiguously serious, particularly violent, offenses in the typical self
report study is quite small. The Philadelphia cohort data apparently include larger numbers
of homicide arrests, and rape arrests (14 and 44 respectively). See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO
& T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 68-99 (1972). As the authors note, the
method of scoring used in this study does not provide information on how many events these
arrests represent. Id. at 23-24. A separate accounting of armed robbery or assault with
deadly weapons was not published. The 193 robbery arrests in the Philadelphia cohort were
not classified by event or seriousness, other than in seriousness scores. By contrast, the Rand
juvenile court study reported 253 armed robbery arrests that resulted in the 104 case sample
which is the basis for Figure 4.
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In the process of passing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion Act of 1974,8 the very first thing that the United States Congress
found was that juveniles account for almost half the arrests for serious
crimes in the United States today. 9 One problem with inferring that
juveniles account for half of all serious crime from these statistics is that
the crude heterogeneous categories used in crime and arrest reporting
lump serious and relatively minor offenses under single rubrics, such as
robbery or assault. 10 A second problem is that younger offenders who
are arrested in groups are counted two, three or even four times in single
offense data far more commonly than are older offenders. The com-
pound effect of treating minor and major offenses with equal statistical
dignity in multiple offender counts is illustrated by Figure 5, adapted
from the previously discussed National Crime Panel data based on rob-
bery victim reports.
Robbers Robberies Gun Robberies
40% 47% 69%
Over 21
Under 21 / /
60% 53%Y, //31%[/
FIGURE 5
PERCENTAGE OF ROBBERS, ROBBERIES AND GUN ROBBERIES BY
AGE*
I[Sw=c Natiol Qim, P 4l
* mixed group cases (N=106) deleted
Offenders under 21 comprise slightly over 60 percent of all the sample's
"robbers," slightly over half of all "robberies," and less than a third of
robberies committed with firearms.
Figure 5 is only the beginning. The estimates contained there use
8 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1109 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 18, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Justice
Act].
9 Id.
to See, e.g., Zimring, Ameyian Youth Piolence: Issues and Trends, 1 CRIME & JUST. ANNUAL
REv. RESEARCH 67 (1979).
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the twenty-first birthday as a cut-line, while juvenile court jurisdiction
typically ends on or before the offender's eighteenth birthday. The sta-
tistics used to compile the congressional findings of fact are FBI esti-
mates of arrests under age 18.11 Since the rate of robbery arrests
increases with age and the proportion of robberies committed with fire-
arms also increases as a function of age, the proportion of firearm rob-
bery events attributable to "juveniles" could plausibly range as low as
10 percent.
In dealing with currently available statistics, using hedge phrases
like "could plausibly range" is well-advised. We simply do not know the
youth share of particular forms of criminal activity, and we cannot use
arrest statistics to derive estimates with acceptable margins of error.
(2) MEASURING ARREST AND PUNISHMENT RISKS IN THE STUDY OF
GENERAL DETERRENCE
The past decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the gen-
eral deterrent effect of the threat of criminal sanctions, and a variety of
efforts to study deterrence by comparing crime rates and punishment
levels over time or between jurisdictions. 12 Attempts to use existing ag-
gregate data on offenses, arrests, and punishments are confounded by
the overlapping jurisdictions of juvenile and criminal courts, and it is
unlikely that researchers can use arrest statistics to "unconfound" mat-
ters.
The problem can be illustrated by examining common methods of
estimating the risks of punishment and apprehension that are used to
measure the credibility of threats in deterrence studies. The "risk of
punishment" reported in Figure 6 is often used and fundamentally
flawed.' 3 By expressing adult prison admissions as a proportion of total
reported offenses, "risk of punishment" measures no one's actual risk of
punishment and will systematically be reduced as the proportion of ju-
venile offenses to total offenses increases. If juveniles are responsible for
a large number of marginally serious offenses that either may or may
not end up classified as a particular index offense, variations in police
reporting and classification practices, as well as variations in the ratio of
juvenile to adult offenses, will produce negative correlations between
crime rates and the risk of punishment that have nothing to do with
general deterrence. 14
11 Juvenile Justice Act, supra note 8, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1974).
12 .S'ee, .g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, PANEL ON RESEARCH IN DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION (FINAL REPORT 1978), for a summary of deterrence literature and methods.
13 See id. at 99-103 for a list of more than a dozen studies that use risk variable displayed
in Figure 6.
14 A particular fear with respect to statistics that generate "artificial deterrence" is that
1981]
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Risk of Punishment =
Number of Prison Commitments (Adults)
Number of Crimes (Juvenile and Adult)
Risk of Apprehension =
Number of Arrests (Juvenile and Adult)
Number of Crimes (juvenile and Adult)
FIGURE 6
CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF ESTIMATING RISK IN
DETERRENCE RESEARCH
Measuring the risk of apprehension by comparing total gross arrests
to total gross offenses in any particular crime category generates similar
problems. The measure is of two separate risks of arrest that cannot be
segregated and a pool of offenses that represents an unknown admixture
of juvenile and adult offenses with varying degrees of severity. Unless
the mixture of adult and juvenile crimes and risks does not vary over
time or from city to city, the result of this mixing will confound attempts
to measure deterrent effects.
Under such circumstances, variations in the age distribution of
crime or in police policy can successfully masquerade as variations in
sentencing policy until we can separately estimate juvenile and adult
offense rates. But the lesson of Figure 5 is that using the age distribution
of arrests to attempt this segregation will not succeed. For this reason, it
seems unlikely that comparative studies using aggregate data can meas-
ure true risks.15
(3) MEASURING THE INCAPACITATION IMPACT OF INCARCERATION
The logic of incapacitation is straightforward: lock up people who
would otherwise commit crimes and the general community will experi-
ence a lower crime rate.1 6 But selecting the appropriate candidates for
incapacitation and estimating the number of crimes saved proves to be a
"junk crimes" and "junk arrests," defined as crimes and arrests that are not likely to receive
serious sanctions in the adult system, are the major share of variations between cities and over
time. If this is the case, variations in juvenile arrests rates could thoroughly confound efforts
to assess the general deterrent impact of criminal sanctions over time or in comparative stud-
ies.
15 The alternative to this approach, however, is attractive. Given the difference between
juvenile and adult criminal sanctions for similar behavior, deterrence theory that can exploit
wide variations in the age of jurisdiction, and variations in patterns for similar crime to dis-
cover whether individuals respond to differences in risks when they cross over the borderline
between juvenile and criminal justice at varying points in their criminal careers.
16 See, e.g., Shinnar & Shinnar, The Efects of the CrnminalJustice System on the Control of Crime:
A Quantitative Approach, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 581 (1975). See also J.Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 198-291 (1975).
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tricky business. Efforts to estimate "crimes saved" have proceeded from
individualistic models of criminal behavior to what may be inaccurate
conclusions. Those studies that found high offense rates in early adoles-
cent target populations have failed to account for the problem of group
involvement. 17 Simply stated, if one of three offenders is taken out of
circulation for one year, we have no current basis for estimating
whether, or to what extent, the crime rate is affected. If all three offend-
ers are incapacitated, it is possible to estimate "crime saved" as a joint
function of the crimes these offenders would have committed alone and
with each other, but not in other groups. Using current methods of in-
capacitative accounting, however, assigning each member of each group
eve0, crime they would have committed together or in other groups cre-
ates a form of double and triple counting that overestimates "crime
saved" in the group-prone adolescent years. The published studies that
purport to measure incapacitation effects have not made serious efforts
to correct for this bias.
(4) MODELING PATTERNS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Frequently, attempts to impose simplifying models to explain varia-
tions in particular offenses cannot succeed because of the diversity of
behaviors subsumed in a single crime category. Robbery is a case in
point, and an illustrative example concerns the determinants of whether
firearms are used in robbery events. Working from a sample of robber-
ies in Boston, John Conklin concluded "robbing with accomplices
reduces the need to carry a weapon for self-protection, since the group
itself acts as a functional equivalent of a weapon."' 8 His data evidently
did not control for age when relating weapon use to the number of of-
fenders involved. Analyzing National Crime Panel data, Philip J. Cook
found the opposite to be true: "Guns are less likely to be used by single
offenders than by multiple offenders and. . . this pattern holds for sub-
groups of offenders. . . as well as for the entire sample. . . ! While it
is plausible that a team of offenders has less 'need of a gun' than a single
offender for a certain type of victim, the data suggest that teams of of-
fenders tend to choose stronger victims."' 19
17 See, e.g., Shinnar & Shinnar, supra note 16; J. PETERSILIA & P. GREENWOOD, CRIMINAL
CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS (1979). The only mention of the problem of incapacitating
one of the group is found in the PANEL ON RESEARCH, supra note 12, at 65 (see especially n.63
and the text accompanying n.64). In contrast, Albert Reiss has recently demonstrated the
impact of group offending on incapacitation effects. Reiss, Understanding Changes in Crime
Rates, in CRIME RATES AND VICTIMIZATION 13-14 (A. Reiss & A. Biderman eds. 1980).
18 J. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (1972); see also the
table at 106.
19 Cook, A Strategic Choice Ana'ysis of Robbery, in SA(MPLE SURVEYS OF THE VICTIMS OF
CRIME 180 (W. Skogan ed.1976).
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It may not be necessary to referee this particular dispute, because
both Conklin and Cook are correctly describing the behavior of different
subsets of robbery offenders-Professor Cook's analysis applies with
force to unpremeditated robberies by young offenders. These patterns
cannot be detected, however, by cross-tabulating weapon use and
number of offenders for the total sample of robberies, as shown in Figure
7.
18% 22% 21% 18%
Number of 2 3 4
Offenders
FIGURE 7
PERCENTAGE GUN USE IN ROBBERIES BY NUMBER OF
OFFENDERS
(S-- N-l C6-u P-d)
It turns out, however, that this flat pattern is misleading. Looking
at these data without controlling for age is precisely the wrong way to
examine the National Crime Panel data because of the greater likeli-
hood that younger offenders (a) will rob in groups and (b) will use guns
less often whether or not they rob in groups.20 Table 2 displays the results
of separate analysis patterns of guns use and number of offenders by age.
For reported victimizations where all of the offenders were thought to be
over 21, there is a modest increase in gun use as the size of the group
increases. For offenders under 21, their youth is a much more powerful
predictor of gun use than the number of robberies. Consistently, gun
use is about a third of adult levels across all categories of offender group
size. Thus, it may be true that young offenders find "courage in num-
bers" when a pre-existing group spontaneously decides to commit a rob-
bery. This is consistent with the low rate of gun use and the low rate of
single offender robberies among younger offenders. Older offenders en-
gage in more planning and exhibit different target selection and accom-
20 The comparison between gun robbers and other robbers charged, see Figure 3 (90%
versus 87% multiple offenders) lends further support to this interpretation.
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plice selection patterns. For planned offenses, the target of the robbery
has a substantial impact on the size of the group and the weapon used.
In spontaneous robberies, the group and armaments have been deter-
mined before the target is selected, but failure to control for age of of-
fender completely obscures these patterns.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE GUN USE IN ROBBERY By AGE OF OFFENDER AND
NUMBER OF OFFENDERS*





4 or more 12 40
(S__ce N.Iw Crime p~u.I Ma.)
* For total robbery event numbers, see Table 1 supra.
(5) COMPREHENDING CRIMINAL "CAREERS"
Almost all American adolescents commit crimes at some point in
the transition to adulthood. Many of these offenses are trivial; most of
the time, adolescent criminality does not represent the beginning of a
pattern of habitual criminality that will extend through adulthood. It
is, however, also true that the majority of those who persist in patterns of
predatory crime through early adulthood have started young.2'
In recent years the study of criminal careers has been the subject of
renewed interest and changing focus. For decades, criminologists have
been interested in factors associated with desisting from or continuing to
commit criminal offenses.22 Recently, such studies have been under-
taken with ambitions to contribute to policy: Finding characteristics
that predict continued criminality is now seen as a path to sentencing
policy, particularly sentencing policies that emphasize the incapacita-
tive effects of incarcerative sanctions.23 Similarly, if social scientists can
find characteristics of adolescent-offending that are associated with a
21 See F.E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: A REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING-PoLCY TOWARD YOUTH OFFENDERS (1978).
22 See, e.g., S. GLUECK & E. T. GLUECK, FIVE HUNDRED CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930); S.
GLUECK & E. T. GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS (1937); S. GLUECK & E. T. GLUECK,
CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT (1943) (Three volumes of follow-up studies on the post-
release careers of 510 inmates of the Massachusetts State Reformatory released in 1921-22).
23 See, e.g., Boland & Wilson, Age, Crime andwnishment, PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1978, at
22; J. Q. WILSON, supra note 16.
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lack of recidivism, this information can be used to allocate scarce penal
resources more efficiently and avoid unnecessary social control.
All of this, of course, depends upon the development of accurate
discriminant indicators of future behavior. The Wolfgang, el al., cohort
study of Philadelphia boys who turned eighteen during 1963 has pro-
vided some promising preliminary cues but stopped far short of predict-
ing adult criminal careers.24 The follow-up study of that Philadelphia
sample may provide further information.25 More recent retrospective
study of individuals imprisoned as adults provides a list of characteris-
tics associated with persisting criminality in the adult years but cannot,
by the nature of the sample, provide data on what factors are associated
with nonpersistence of criminal activity. 26
The distinctive group character of adolescent criminality may pro-
vide a perspective that can increase the capacity of research to empiri-
cally test the degree to which prior behavior predicts future offenses. At
some point in adolescence or early adult development, most of those
who have committed offenses in groups either cease to be offenders or
continue to violate the law, but for different reasons and in different
configurations. Either of these paths is a significant change from prior
behavior. The transition from group criminality to noncriminal indi-
vidual behavior is obviously worthy of sustained study. The equally im-
portant transition from adolescent to adult patterns of criminal
behavior should also be a particularly important period in the analysis
of criminal careers.
At the outset it is important to identify when transitions from juve-
nile to adult criminality and from adolescent criminality to desistance
occur. This is not to suggest that the search is for a particular day when
crime is abandoned or when patterns of criminality change; rather, both
transitions should be expected to be processes that occur over substantial
periods of time, and occur at different stages in the life history of differ-
ent individuals. But identification and study of these transitional peri-
ods, in individual cases and cohorts, could enhance our understanding
of criminality as a developmental event and sharpen the empirical focus
of the questions to be asked in predicting future criminality.
One critical contribution of this focus would be to discriminate be-
24 For this discussion of the implications of the Wolfgang data on the concentration and
predictability of youth violence, see Zimring, supra note 10, at 94-98.
25 For a preliminary report of the Philadelphia follow-up study set Wolfgang, From Bey to
Man, in THE SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER 101 (Hudson & Mack eds. 1978) (proceedings
of a National Symposium, Government Printing Office). A book length report on this re-
search is forthcoming.
26 J. PETERSILIA & P. GREENWOOD, supra note 17; a second Rand report, DOING CRIME
utilizes a weighted sample of all prison inmates who retrospectively study preprison careers
for currently incarcerated inmates. RAND CORP., DOING CRIME (Apr. 1980).
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tween predictive attributes or events that occur early in an adolescent
career and those predictive events that occur more proximately to the
transition out of crime or into different patterns of crime. A complete
accounting scheme should separately consider:
(1) Characteristics of the individual, such as age, location, and fam-
ily structure that antedate or accompany the early adolescent years;
(2) Aspects of the individual's involvement in early adolescent
crime, including the kind of crime, age at first arrest, the type of group
participating in crime, and the nature of the individual's role--dominant
or passive-in adolescent group activities; and
(3) Events or influences that occur later in adolescence that predict
the nature of the change in the individual behavior.
Aggregate statistics on the distribution of arrests suggest that the
transition out of criminality is not a random event spread over the late
teens and through the mid-twenties, but rather clusters in late adoles-
cence. However, my previous remarks suggest that aggregate arrest sta-
tistics are an insufficient foundation for studying this phenomenon.
Those years where gross arrest rates decline are also periods when arrest
statistics underestimate the extent of criminal participation when arrest
rates of older age groups are compared to those of younger groups. 27
When looking for the transition to "adult style" individual or
planned group crime, there is no reason to select a priori any single one
or two year period when we expect such a transition to occur. Case
history studies and cohort samples can collect data on the nature of each
individual offense coming to the attention of the police,28 and other sup-
plemental methods, such as self-report studies, can be used to determine
the period of transition, its duration, and its significant concomitants.
(6) DETERMINING APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS FOR YOUTH CRIME
Statistics on the sanctions adminstered to young offenders in juve-
nile or family courts strike many observers as a classic instance of social
non-control. The most impressive numbers come from New York City,
a criminogenically congested urban area where only offenders under six-
teen are referred to the Family Court. One study of.nearly 4,000 juve-
nile robbery arrests found that more than half of these charges were
dismissed without formal referral to the Family Court, and over three-
quarters of all charges are eventually dismissed. 29 Barbara Boland and
James Q. Wilson cite the end result of this study with evident disap-
27 For age specific arrest estimates (with insufficient warnings about this difficulty), see
F.E. ZIMRING, supra note 21, Table 1-2, at 37.
28 See M. WOLFGANG, R. FiGLIo, & T. SEWLtN, supra note 7.
29 Office of Children's Services, N.Y. Division of Criminal justice Services, citedin Boland
& Wilson, supra note 23, at 28 (Table 1).
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proval, "In short, only three percent of the juveniles arrested for robbery
and only seven percent of the juveniles actually tried in Family Court
received any form of custodial care, whether with a relative, in a Juve-
nile Home or training school, or in an adult prison. '30 In Los Angeles,
another study estimated the chances of a formal determination of delin-
quency at 17 for every 100 arrests.3 1 This kind of statistical portrait
lends itself nicely to fears of an army of young violent offenders roaming
the streets unchecked. The observer may also be tempted to conclude
that the philosophy and youth welfare policies of the juvenile court are
the explanation for such epidemic leniency.
Serious study of the relationship between age, crime, and punish-
ment has only recently been undertaken. But the early returns suggest
that the forces that produce such apparently alarming examples of "case
mortality" are at once more complicated and less dependent on juvenile
court philosophy than many had supposed.32
The animating philosophy of child protection in the juvenile court
undoubtedly reduces the number of arrests that result in formal adjudi-
cations of delinquency and post-adjudication commitment in secure fa-
cilities. However, a number of juvenile court policies not clearly related
to leniency toward the young also contribute to high rates of informal
dispostion. In marginal cases, police might arrest juvenile offenders ex-
pecting the case to be "adjusted" at intake but relying on the arrest as a
sanction and an opportunity for compiling a dossier.3 3 The juvenile
court's well documented use of detention after arrest as a substitute for
formal adjudication represents a troublesome social control device that
is not visible when only the post-trial sanctions are examined. This is
important because nationwide detention is about seven times as fre-
quent as post-adjudication commitment to secure facilities.3 4 It is diffi-
cult to view detention practices as part of a sentimental general theory
of youth protection.
Aggregate statistics on juvenile arrests reflect more than the distinc-
tive policies and style of the contemporary juvenile court. The offenders
30 Id. at 27-28.
31 This estimate was derived by Peter W. Greenwood, in P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA,
& F.E. ZIMRING, AGE, CRIME, AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO
ADULT COURT, (1980) from K.S. Teilmann & M.W. Klein, Assessment of the Impact of Calyor-
nia's 1977JuvenileJustice Legislation (1977) (Draft, Social Science Research Institute, Univer-
sity of Southern California).
32 See P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERsILIA & F.E. ZIMRING, sufra note 31.
33 See Coffee, Prtvacv Versus Parens Patriae: The Role of Police Records in the Sentencing and
Surveillance ofjuveniles, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 579-94 (1972) for a discussion of arrests as a
means of building a dossier on juveniles and for discussion of analogous procedures in New
York City.
34 F.E. ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 65-82.
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processed in juvenile justice systems are different from other criminal
defendants-they are younger, and their youth is an important influ-
ence on sentencing policy in criminal as well as juvenile courts.3 5 Fur-
thermore, and of central importance for present purposes, the offenses
committed in early and middle adolescence also differ qualitatively from
the criminal activity characteristic of older offender populations. The
propensity of adolescent robbers to commit less serious forms of the of-
fense than their elders must be taken into account in providing an expla-
nation for the New York and Los Angeles statistics discussed earlier.3 6 It
is far from clear what the most just or efficient social response shoud be
to adolescent garage burglaries, fist fights, and school-yard extortions.
The pervasive problem of the adolescent accessory aggravates the
difficulty of determining appropriate sanctions for youth crime. One
useful example occurs early in the cohort study volume, when its authors
are discussing the proper assessment of "seriousness scores":
Let us suppose that three boys have committed a burglary. They range in
age from 12 to 16 years. The oldest is the instigator and leader who ac-
tively committed the offense with one of the others: the youngest is an
unwilling partner who was ignorant of the plan but was present because he
happened to be with the others at the start of what began as an idle saun-
ter through the streets of the neighborhood. Suppose the event is given a
score of 4. Does this score, when applied to each participant, accurately
measure the involvement of each? Should the oldest boy and his active
partner be assessed this score, but the youngest given a lower one?37
In any system of justice that considers the magnitude of the harm done
and the degree of the individual offender's involvement, the attempt to
determine an appropriate sanction will confront the same difficulties as
the researcher attempting to determine an appropriate score.
In discussing this case, Wolfgang and his colleagues state that all
three offenders are equally guilty "from a legal point of view."'3 8 This
statement is correct but potentially misleading. Assuming a trier of fact
determines that the youngest was a reluctant but voluntary partner
who aided and abetted the offense, all three adolescents can be found
delinquent in a juvenile court.39 This kind of group crime would also
35 Id. at 35-44, 65-82.
36 A first effort to control for offense seriousness by age in Los Angeles is discussed in
P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA & F.E. ZIMRING, supra note 31.
37 M.- WOLFGANG, R. FiGuo, & T. SELLIN, sufra, note 7, at 23-24.
38 Id. at 24.
39 My discussion in the text assumes a "modem" definition of delinquency, that is, a sta-
tus conferred when a minor is found to have committed an act that would have been criminal
if performed by an adult. Broader definition of delinquency, including standards such as "in
danger of leading an immoral life," or "associating with bad companions," would obviate the
necessity for determining the nature of our twelve year olds' participation. See INSTIrUTE OF
JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DE-
1981]
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
generate criminal liability for the appropriate degree of burglary in a
criminal court through the magic of the doctrine of accessorial liabil-
ity.40 But prosecutorial discretion in selecting cases for prosecution, de-
termining charges, and pressing for punishment combined with judicial
discretion in determining sentences in both juvenile and criminal courts
creates ample opportunity for differences in punishment policy that are
not reflected in the formal substantive law of either crime or delin-
quency.
When sentencing policy is dispensed by a series of low visibility dis-
cretions, a system can have a policy toward accomplice problems in ado-
lescence without announcing it, and not infrequently without knowing
it. In the Rand study of the Los Angeles juvenile court, lone offenders
arrested for armed robbery experienced a three-in-ten chance of com-
mitment to the state's youth authority, while only thirteen percent of
those who acted in groups received this most serious disposition avail-
able to the court. It seems plausible to suppose that much of this differ-
ence can be attributed to prosecutorial and judicial leniency toward
individuals at the periphery of spontaneous adolescent crimes. But the
discretionary decisions characteristic of juvenile justice hide rather than
announce the real reasons they are made.
This article's ambitions fall short of resolving the complicated set of
problems generated by the juvenile accomplice; instead, it is sufficient
for present purposes to note the novelty and importance of these issues
in the study of dispositional policy toward youth crime and realistic ef-
forts to reform the law. To study dispositional patterns in juvenile court
without paying careful attention to policies toward group offenses seems
foolhardy. To assign to each of the three youths arrested in the hypo-
thetical burglary discussed above the same seriousness score, and to use
that score to predict the level of sanctions, will create the impression
that serious crimes go unpunished if any of the group is excused because
his participation was relatively minor.41 This kind of research proce-
dure will also continue our ignorance about how participants in group
crime are sanctioned.
Attempts to reform sentencing practices in the juvenile court, ex-
pecially efforts to lead sanctioning models away from the jurisprudence
of treatment and toward concepts of making the punishment fit the
UNQUENCY AND SANCTIONS (tentative draft 1977) at 17-27 [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS].
40 See, e.g., Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (1980); see also Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARv. L. REV. 689 (1930).
41 This weakness characterizes any research procedure that converts events into serious-
ness scores and gives the total score to each offender as well as studies that use offense and
arrest. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, & T. SELLIN, supra note 7; STRASBURG, VIOLENT
DELINQUENTS (1978) (A Report to the Ford Foundation from the Vera Institute of Justice).
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crime, will find the myriad problems of sanctioning the adolescent ac-
complice very close to the top of any sensible priority list for delibera-
tion. These issues are important because they confront whatever set of
institutions will process young offenders in a majority of all cases. The
issues are novel because the nature of group criminality in adolescence
bears scant resemblance to the classic image of the criminal conspiracy
or the conceptual foundations of the common law of accessorial liability.
The intelligent law reformer thus must take a short course in criminol-
ogy as a preliminary to setting his agenda. My own review of recent
literature and debate suggests that this sequence of events is infre-
quent.42
CONCLUSION
The path of progress in social science proceeds more frequently
from the general to the specific than the other way around. A survey of
some of the difficulties generated by inattention to the special character
of adolescent criminality bears an uncanny resemblance to a revised re-
search agenda. Much that needs to be done can be done in the near
future, using relatively straightforward methods of measurement on less
than staggering budgets.
The criminological excursion reported in these pages illustrates a
broader point: Those who regulate particular forms of human behavior,
or study the effects of regulation, abstract themselves from the knowl-
edge base of other social and behavioral sciences only at great cost. In
an era when the study of public policy has become a discipline of its
own, at a time when the study of law and legal institutions has devel-
oped prescriptive ambitions, the well-known secret is an occupational
hazard of no small significance.
42 For example, two of the Juvenile Justice Standards volumes are closely related to juve-
nile court policy toward youth crime, but they contain no substantive analysis of the appro-
priate role of doctrines of accessorial liability, or conspiracy. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
SANCrIONS, supra note 39, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSMON (tentative draft 1977). While the role of peer pres-
sure is not discussed, standard 3.4 argues against delinquency jurisdiction if a parent or
guardian coerced a juvenile's participation in a criminal act, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
SANCTIONS, supra note 39, at 33, commentary. Further, the commentaries in these volumes
contain no analysis of patterns of youth crime, the magnitude of the problem, or typologies of
youth crime.
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